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ABSTRACT
In many European countries sectoral bargaining agreements are automatically extended to cover all
firms in an industry. Employers and employees can also negotiate firm-specific contracts. We use
a large matched employer-employee data set from Spain to study the effects of firm-level contracting
on  the  structure  of  wages.  We  estimate  a  series  of  wage  determination  models,  including
specifications that control for individual characteristics, co-worker characteristics, the bargaining
status of the workplace, and the probability the workplace is covered by a firm-level contract. We
find that firm-level contracting is associated with a 5-10 percent wage premium, with larger
premiums for more highly paid workers. Although we cannot decisively test between alternative
explanations for the firm-level contracting premium, workers with firm-specific contracts have
significantly longer job tenure, suggesting that the premium is at least partially a non-competitive
phenomenon.
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2Previous studies of this issue include Dell’Aringa and Lucifora (1994), who examine a sample
of manufacturing plants in Italy, Hartog, Leuven, and Teulings (2002), who study the
Netherlands,  Canal and Rodriguez (2004), who examine the effect of firm-level bargaining on
wage inequality within firms in Spain, and Hartog, Pereira, and Vieira, 2005, who study the
effects of the level of bargaining in Portugal.  Bover, Bentolila and Arellano (2002) report some
results on the impact of firm-level bargaining in Spain. 
3The Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys conducted in Australia and the UK share a similar
design, although these surveys have relatively small sample sizes compared to the Spanish
survey.
In many European countries, industry-wide contracts negotiated by employer
associations and unions are automatically extended to all workplaces.
1  Individual employers can
also sign firm-specific agreements with their employees.  Despite the extensive literature linking
differences in the centralization of wage contracting to cross-country differences in
macroeconomic performance (e.g., Bruno and Sachs, 1985; Calmfors and Driffill, 1988; Nickell
and Layard, 1999; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Calmfors, 2001) there is much less evidence on
how the level of contracting affects the structure of wages.
2  Studies from the U.S. and U.K.
suggest that decentralized collective bargaining tends to increase the mean and reduce the
inequality of wages relative to non-union wage-setting (see Card, Lemieux, and Riddell, 2004
for a recent review).  In countries with automatic extension of sectoral contracts, however, the
key question is how decentralized bargaining compares to more centralized wage setting.
In this paper we use a detailed employer-employee data set from Spain to study how the
level of contracting affects the structure of wages.  Spanish law extends industry-level
agreements negotiated at the regional or national level to all establishments, regardless of union
membership.  Fifteen percent of workers are covered by firm-specific contracts that override the
prevailing sectoral agreement.  Our data set includes information for up to 60 workers per firm at
a random sample of larger workplaces.
3   Comparisons across workers covered by different types
of agreements suggest that the wage structure is very similar under national and regional2
4Using a U.S. sample of establishments that change union status as a result of a union
certification election, DiNardo and Lee (2004) find no effect of union coverage on wages,
contrary to the huge body of work based on individual level wages that finds a sizeable union
premium.
contracts, while wages negotiated under firm-specific agreements are systematically higher.
As noted in a recent study by Dinardo and Lee (2004), microeconometric studies of
collective bargaining based on samples of workers may potentially confound bargaining status
with other firm-level characteristics.
4  In the absence of a research design for isolating
exogenous variation in the probability of firm-level bargaining, we implement a propensity
score-based method (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Imbens, 2004) to control for observed firm
characteristics as flexibly as possible.  Building on the structure of our data set, we estimate a
model for the probability of firm-level contracting at a given establishment, and then include
polynomial terms in the estimated probability (i.e., the propensity score) as controls in our
individual-level models.  We also estimate separate models for men and women in different skill
groups.  The results suggest that conventional wage determination models overstate the premium
associated with firm-level contracting relative to our more flexible specifications.  Combining
the estimates by skill group and gender we find that firm-level contracting increases mean wages
for both men and women, with a larger effect for more highly paid workers of either gender.  
There are several competing explanations for the positive wage premium associated with
firm-level contracts.  The simplest is rent-sharing (e.g., Krueger and Summers, 1988;
Blanchflower, Oswald, and Sanfey, 1996).  An alternative is that employees at workplaces with
firm-level contracts are required to work harder, as in efficiency wage models (Akerlof, 1982; 
Akerlof and Yellen, 1988; Weiss, 1990; Mahuteau, 2002).  A third possibility is that despite our
best econometric efforts, the wage premium reflects unmeasured ability differences.   These3
5The elections are in principle regulated by the state but de facto run by national unions.  Most of
the elected representatives are affiliated with one of the two major trade union organizations (the
socialist UGT and the former communist CC.OO).  The coverage of different agreements was
largely inherited from the earlier regime (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living
and Working Conditions, 1998).   Bentolila and Jimeno (2002) discuss some key institutional
features of the regulation of collective bargaining in Spain.
interpretations differ in the extent to which workers are better off under firm-specific contracting
than under alternative arrangements, leading to different predictions about the relationship
between firm-specific contracting and voluntary turnover.  We therefore examine differences in
job tenure associated with firm-specific contracts (Krueger and Summers, 1988).   We find that
average job tenures of men and women are about 2 years longer at workplaces with firm-specific
contracts.  Consistent with our finding that firm level contracting raises wages more for more
highly skilled workers, the tenure gap is larger for more highly paid men, though not
significantly so for women.  These results lend some support for a simple rent-based explanation
for the firm-specific contracting premium. 
I.  Institutional Setting
During the Franco era wage setting in Spain was centralized and highly regulated. 
Legally-recognized trade unions and employer groups negotiated contracts covering most jobs in
the economy, subject to final approval by the state (Milner and Metcalf, 1994).  The post-Franco
constitution established a system for the election of worker representatives to regional or
industry level bargaining units, organized along the lines of the earlier regime.
5 The terms of the
agreements reached at the industry and regional level between workers and employer groups are
legally binding on all employers within the scope of the agreement.  Thus, despite a relatively
low rate of union membership (15 percent or less), collective bargaining coverage in Spain is4
6Agriculture, food services, and household services industries have relatively low coverage. 
7Legal reforms adopted in 1994 allow a firm contract to specify wages below the prevailing
sectoral level.  Before these reforms, firm-level contracts could only improve on conditions in
the sectoral agreement (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working
Conditions, 1998).   
very high (80 percent or more).
6
At the firm level, worker representatives form works councils that negotiate over issues
like staffing and absenteeism policies.  They can also bargain over wages, and employees have
the right to strike in support of demands for a firm-specific contract with wages above the scale
of the prevailing sectoral contract.
7  Data collected from contract agreements by Izquierdo,
Moral, and Urtasun (2003) show that about 15 percent of Spanish workers were covered by firm-
level contracts in the early 1990s.  Practitioners believe that firm-specific agreements are more
likely to occur at firms with higher potential rents, and in workplaces where there is (or was) a
strong union presence (Canal and Rodriguez, 2004).  Consistent with these notions, firm-level
contracting is more prevalent at larger firms, and in certain sectors, including extractive
industries, energy, and transportation.  We are unaware of any estimates of the rates that firm-
specific contracts are established or dissolved.  The relative coverage of different types of
contracts in different industries was very stable over the 1990s (Izquierdo, Moral, and Urtasun,
2003, Tables A1 and A2), suggesting that contract status at a workplace is highly persistent.
The Spanish industrial relations system, comprised of a network of sectoral contracts
overlaid with optional firm-specific agreements,  is similar to the system in Italy (Dell’Aringa
and Lucifora, 1994) and the Netherlands (Hartog, Leuven, and Teulings, 2002).  The institution
of firm-specific bargaining also shares some similarities with the system of decentralized
collective bargaining in the “Anglo Saxon” countries.   An employer’s decision to accept a firm-5
8Establishments with at least 10 workers in the General Registry of Payments to Social Security
were stratified by autonomous community and size.  An average of 5 workers were selected at
firms with 10-20 workers, an average of 7 at firms with 21-50 workers, an average of 12 at firms
with 51-100 workers, an average of 23 at firms with 100-200 workers, and an average of 25 at
employers with more than 200 workers. Establishments with 10 or more workers accounted for
just over 70 percent of the total working population in Spain in 1995.
specific contract, for example,  is comparable to the voluntary union recognition process in the
U.K.  (Disney, Gosling, and Machin, 1996).  The bargaining process under firm-specific
contracting presumably reflects the same combination of political and economic forces that
influence unionized wage setting in the U.S. and the U.K.  The key difference is the nature of the
“default” wage structure.  The alternative to a firm-specific contract in Spain is the prevailing
sectoral contract, whereas in the U.S. and the U.K. the alternative is the nonunion labor market.  
This means that any comparison between the effects of firm-level bargaining in the Anglo Saxon
countries and in countries with comprehensive sectoral agreements like Spain or Italy must be
interpreted carefully.  Even if workers’ representatives share similar objectives across countries,
firm-level bargaining may result in a more equal wage structure relative to the alternative in the
U.S. or U.K., but a less equal wage structure relative to the alternative in Spain. 
II.  Data Description and Preliminary Analysis
To set the stage for our empirical analysis it is useful to briefly summarize the key
features of our matched data set.  The 1995 Spanish Wage Structure Survey (ESS95) surveyed
around 15,000 establishments in the manufacturing, construction, trade, and service industries,
collecting detailed salary and job information for up to 60  employees in each selected
workplace.
8  The unique design of the survey allows us to model wage outcomes at the employee
level while including controls for co-worker and establishment characteristics.  The main6
9Sisson et al. (1991) report that Spain has the highest fraction of workers at small establishments
among EU countries. 
10The prevalence of firm-specific contracts is higher in the ESS95 than in the workforce as a
whole, reflecting the exclusion of small establishments and sectors like agriculture and
household services.
11See Guell and Petrongolo (2003) and de la Rica (2004).  Employees hired under temporary (or
“fixed term”) contracts can be readily terminated once their contract is over, whereas those hired
under regular (or “indefinite”) contracts can only be terminated under certain circumstances.   
limitation of the ESS95 is coverage: agriculture, mining, and household services are missing
from the sample, as are small establishments (under 10 workers) and workers in the relatively
large “underground” sector of Spanish economy who do not pay Social Insurance taxes (see
Lemieux and de la Rica, 1994).
9
For convenience we focus on the subsample of workers in the ESS95 with non-missing
data on individual, job, and firm characteristics.  We also exclude the relatively small fraction
(under 5 percent) of part-time workers, yielding an analysis sample of about 130,000 workers at
14,300 establishments.  Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the overall sample and for
workers covered by the three different levels of contracts: national contracts (35 percent of
workers), regional contracts (42 percent of workers), and firm-specific contracts (23 percent of
workers).
10 
Comparisons across the columns of Table 1 show that there are systematic differences
between workers covered by different types of contracts.  For example, employees at workplaces
with firm-specific contracts are older, have a higher probability of holding a university
education, and are a little less likely to be female.  Two other key differences are temporary
contract status and job tenure.  Temporary contracts were introduced in Spain in 1984 as a way
to encourage new hiring, and by the early 1990s accounted for nearly one-third of total
employment.
11   Although the law requires equal pay for temporary workers they earn lower7
Fixed-term contracts can be extended for up to three years, but after that point the employee
must be terminated or offered a regular contract.  Though firms are formally prohibited from
filling jobs by cycling temporary workers, evidence in the size of the temporary workforce
suggests that most young workers spend more than three years on temporary contract position
before obtaining an indefinite contract.  
12The best available information on the coverage of different contract types is from Izquierdo,
Moral, and Urtasan’s (2003) analysis of the universe of labor contracts.   In the mid-1990s, they
estimate that the average firm with a firm-level contract had about 300 workers, versus 200 for
firms with national contracts, and 15 for firms with regional contracts. 
wages, presumably because of differences in unobserved skills (de la Rica, 2004).  As shown in
Table 1, establishments with firm-level contracts employ a lower fraction of temporary workers. 
Since temporary contracts are limited to three years, there is a strong correlation between the
fraction of temporary contracts at a workplace and the distribution of job tenure, partially
explaining the higher average job tenure for workers covered by firm contracts.
The middle rows of Table 1 show that establishment characteristics also vary by contract
type.  Larger establishments, manufacturing plants, and plants that supply a regional or
international market are more likely to offer firm-specific contracts.
12  The establishment size
differential is particularly important: nearly one-half of the workers covered by firm-level
contracts are employed at establishments with 200 or more workers, compared with only 10
percent of workers covered by regional contracts and 22 percent of those covered by national
agreements.  Finally, the bottom rows of Table 1 show that occupational distributions are also
different in the three contracting groups, with more managers and fewer service workers under
firm-level contracts.  
The employee compensation data in the ESS95 includes “base wages” and “wage
complements”.  Base wages are determined from the appropriate contract by occupation and
grade within a firm, while wage complements include factors like seniority and shift premiums,8
13In brief, the DiNardo Fortin Lemieux procedure estimates the relative probability that a worker
with given characteristics is employed in the overall sample and in a given sub-sector, and uses
this probability to “up-weight” or “down-weight” workers who are under- or over-represented in
the sub-sector so that the weighted distribution of skill characteristics is the same in the sub-
sector as the overall sample.
as well as discretionary supplements awarded to individual employees. The ESS95 survey
gathered information from company records on both components, and we use the sum of these
two, expressed in pesetas per hour, as our measure of compensation.  Table 2 presents means and
standard deviations of log hourly wages for men and women in the overall sample and in the
three different contract sectors.  The first two columns show the unadjusted sample moments,
while columns 3 and 4 show adjusted moments, obtained using the re-weighting technique of
DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) to adjust the distribution of observed characteristics for
each contract sector back to the overall distribution.
13 We calculated the weights for this
procedure using separate probit models for the probability of employment in each of the three
sectors.  The explanatory variables for these probit models include age, education, industry (6
dummies), occupation (4 dummies), market orientation (2 dummies), and firm size (5 dummies). 
Without adjusting for differences in observed worker and firm characteristics, wages are
lower under regional contracts than national contracts, and higher under firm-level contracting. 
Standardizing for the observed characteristics, however, mean wages in regional and national
contracts are nearly identical, while wages under firm-level contracts are 10-12 percent higher
for both men and women.  Wage dispersion is a little higher in national contracts than firm-
specific contracts, and substantially lower in regional contracts.  Again, however, standardizing
for the observed skill characteristics brings the regional and national sectors into very close
alignment.  Based on the evidence in Table 2 and related analysis we conclude that the structure9
14Canal and Rodriguez (2004) likewise combine workers covered by regional and national
contracts.
of pay is very similar under regional and national contracts in Spain, and for the remainder of
this paper we group the two together and focus on the contrast between firm-specific and sector-
level contracts.
14
    Although the results in Table 2 give some indication of how mean wages vary by
contracting sector, they do not address the issue of whether the type of contract exerts a different
effect on different types of workers.  Bover, Bentolila and Arellano (2002), for example, have
argued that collectively-bargained wage levels are only relevant for less-skilled workers in
Spain, suggesting that choice of contract type may have little effect on highly-skilled workers. 
To provide some simple evidence on this issue, we estimated the mean log wages of men and
women in narrowly-defined age-education cells working under firm-specific and sectoral
(national or regional) contracts.   Specifically, we divided workers into 56 cells, using 8 age
categories and 7 education ranges.  We then graphed the mean wages of workers with firm-
specific contracts against the means for the same age-education group under centralized
bargaining.
The results are shown in Figures 1 and 2.  For reference, each graph also shows the 45
degree line.  If mean wages were the same in the two sectors the points would lie along this line. 
Examination of the graph shows that the points actually lie above the 45 degree line, with a
scatter that is roughly parallel to the 45 degree line for men and a little steeper for women. 
These simple graphs suggest that firm-level contracting raises wages relative to sectoral
contracting in Spain, with a premium that is slightly higher for older and better-educated women,10
15Similar graphical comparisons of union and nonunion wages in the U.S., Britain, and Canada
show that in Anglo Saxon countries firm-level collective bargaining tends to raise wages more
for less skilled workers, relative to the non-union sector (Card, Lemieux, and Riddell, 2004).
but roughly similar across groups for men.
15
   An important limitation of these comparisons is that we are not controlling for other
factors – e.g., firm size - that may be correlated with the incidence of firm-specific contracting
and may also exert a direct effect on wages.   To extend the analysis we need a more complete
econometric model of the wage determination process. 
III.  Empirical Framework
Our formal analysis of wage outcomes in the ESS95 data is based on a model of earnings
for worker i at establishment j of the form:
(1) yij   =     Xi $   +   *ij    +    ai     +   ,ij   ,
where yij represents the log hourly wage of individual i,  Xi is a set of observed skill
characteristics (such as age and education) of worker i, ai represents any unobserved skill
characteristics, *ij represents the wage premium earned by worker i at workplace j (including the
possible impact of having a firm-level contract at the workplace), and ,ij is a stochastic error
component.   To model the effect of firm-level contracting, we assume that the wage premium
for worker i at workplace j depends on four factors: the average characteristics of all workers at
the workplace (Xj), a vector of firm-level covariates (Zj), an indicator for the presence of a firm-
specific contract (Fj), and an unobserved firm-level component (vj): 
(2) *ij    =    Xj0   +    Fj"   +   Zj(  +   vj .
These assumptions lead to a model for individual wages of the form: 11
16The estimate of " will only be the same if the firm level model is estimated by weighted
least squares, using the number of workers observed at the firm as a weight. 
(3) yij   =     Xi$    +   Xj0   +    Fj"    +   Zj(   +    ai    +    vj   +   ,ij ,
which includes individual-level controls, co-worker characteristics, firm characteristics, contract
status, and an establishment-level error component.   Assuming that ai and vj are uncorrelated
with contract status (conditional on the observed worker and firm characteristics), the firm-level
contract effect " can be estimated consistently by a conventional (OLS) regression applied to
(3).  An identical estimate of " can be obtained by estimating a model for the average wage at
each establishment that includes average worker characteristics, the vector of firm-level
covariates Zj and the contract status indicator Fj.
16
More generally, unobserved worker or firm characteristics may be correlated with
contract status, leading to potential biases in the estimation of ".  In particular, suppose that ai
varies across workers, with
(4a) E[ ai | Xi,  Xj,  Zj, Fj ]   =    Xi Na    +    Xj 8a   +    Zj 2a    +    Fj :a ,
and similarly, suppose that vj varies across firms with 
(4b) E[ vj | Xi,  Xj,  Zj, Fj ]   =     Xj 8v   +    Zj 2v    +    Fj :v .
Combining these equations with equations (1) and (2), the correctly specified worker level
model is
(5)    yij   =  Xi ($+Na+Nv)  +  Xj (0+8a+8v)  +  Zj((+2a +2v) + Fj(" + :a+:v)  
           +  aNi  +  vNj  +   ,ij ,
where aNi  and vNj  represent unobserved ability and workplace components that are orthogonal to
the observed data.  Consideration of this model shows that if contract status is correlated with
either the unobserved ability of workers or  unobserved firm-specific wage factors, then the12
17Evidence from union status changers (Lemieux, 1993; Card, 1996) suggests this is true
for workers with low observed skills, but that the opposite pattern arises for workers with
higher observed skills, so that on average the bias is modest. 
18The lack of attention to firm-specific factors could be attributed to the fact that in a
standard neoclassical model, there are no firm-specific components of wages.  It is widely
acknowledged, however, that wages vary with many characteristics of firms, including firm
size (see Idson and Oi, 1999). 
measured effect of a firm-level contract will include the true effect (") as well as the bias factors
:a and :v.
The possibility of a systematic correlation between unobserved ability and contract status
is often raised in discussions of the measured union wage effect in Anglo-Saxon countries. 
Lewis (1986), for example, argued that unionized employers in the U.S. can choose from a
queue of applicants, leading to positive correlation between union status and unobserved
ability.
17  One advantage of our data set is the availability of information on the characteristics of
co-workers.  Under plausible assumptions on the hiring process, workers with higher unobserved
ability will tend to have co-workers with higher average skills (and conversely for workers with
low unobserved ability), implying that some of the effects of unobserved ability will be
eliminated by controlling for co-worker skills. Thus, we believe that unobserved ability effects
are likely to be less of a problem for specifications that control for co-worker characteristics than
in the usual case where co-worker characteristics are unknown. 
Though the issue has received less attention in the literature on union wage
determination, a similar problem arises in the presence of unobserved firm-specific wage
factors.
18 Dinardo and Lee (2004), for example, argue that union status in the U.S. is correlated
with firm-level characteristics associated with higher wages.  In the absence of a research design
for isolating exogenous differences in contracting status, we follow an alternative approach of13
attempting to control as flexibly as possible for the full set of observed firm-level characteristics
that determine the level of bargaining.  As shown in Imbens (2004), if contract status is
“ignorable” (i.e., as good as random) conditional on the observed control variables (including the
mean characteristics of the workforce, industry, and firm size) then conditioning on the
probability p(Zj, Xj) that establishment j has a firm-level contract will eliminate any bias in the
estimation of " arising from the correlation with firm characteristics.  We implement this idea by
first fitting a probit model for the probability of a firm level contract, and then including a
polynomial function of the predicted probability from this model as an additional set of control
variables in our wage equation.  
The advantage of this approach is that it provides a simple and parsimonious way to
control for effects of the observed variables that affect the probability of having a firm-level
contract: all the relevant information is condensed into the one-dimensional propensity score. 
Like a regression approach, propensity-score based methods can only provide valid estimates if
there are no differences in unobserved wage determinants that vary by contract status.  However,
models that control for the estimated propensity score are in principle more robust to functional
form issues (Imbens, 2004).
IV.  Wage Determination Models
We turn now to the estimation of models for individual-level wage outcomes in the
ESS95.  Table 3 presents a series of regression models for male and female workers that include
an indicator for firm-level contracting status and a variety of other control variables.  The models
are estimated by weighted least squares, using the sampling weight for each worker as a14
19The ESS95 sampling weights reflect the relative probabilities of sample selection for
different establishments, and are the same for all workers from a given establishment.  
Since our sample includes multiple observations per employer, the standard errors are
calculated allowing a shared error component (i.e., “clustered” by employer). 
weight.
19  The first model for each gender group (specification [1]) includes only a dummy for
firm-level contracting.  This has an estimated coefficient of just over 30 percent for both men
and women, suggesting a very large wage premium for firm-level contracting.  As shown by the
results from specification [2], however, two-thirds or more of this gap is explained by
differences in the characteristics of workers and firms with firm-level contracts.  The covariates
in this specification include the individual worker’s age and education, a dummy indicating
whether he or she is employed on a temporary contract, a vector of controls for the market
orientation and public ownership status of the firm, and dummies for establishment size,
occupation, industry, and region.  Many of the control variables are highly significant, and their
inclusion raises the R-squared statistics to around 50%. These models are similar to the
specifications fit in many previous studies of wage determination in the U.S., the U.K., and
continental Europe, and yield estimated premiums for firm-level bargaining that are comparable
to (or a little smaller than) the unionized wage premiums typically estimated in the U.S. 
As we noted in Section III, a potential issue in the estimation of the wage premium
associated with firm-level contracting is the presence of unobserved ability differences across
workers.  One way to partially control for the associated biases is to include measures of the skill
characteristics of co-workers in similar positions at the same firm.  Controlling for a worker’s
observed skills, a higher level of co-worker skills implies that the worker has above-average
unobserved skill characteristics.  Conversely, lower co-worker skills suggest below-average
unobserved skills.  The models in the third and sixth columns of Table 3 add mean co-worker15
20We have also fit models in which include the mean wage of all co-workers, and co-
workers in narrower occupational subgroups.  Appendix Table A1 reports several
alternative specifications. The results from these models are quite similar to results
reported in Table 3.
21There is an extensive North American literature relating wages to the fraction of women
in the occupation or job classification – see e.g. Johnson and Solon (1986) and Baker and
Fortin (2001).  De la Rica (2003) conducts an extensive analysis of the gender wage gap in
the ESS95, focusing on the effects of gender composition.
characteristics, averaged over all employees at the same establishment in the same broad
occupational group.
20   Comparisons of the models with and without the co-worker variables
suggest that the addition of these controls leads to a 10-15% reduction in the estimated effect of
firm-level contracting.  The addition of co-worker characteristics also reduces the measured
impacts of the corresponding individual variables. For example, comparing models [2] and [3],
the addition of co-worker characteristics reduces the coefficient of individual education by about
8% for men and 19% for women and the coefficient of individual age by about 10% for men and
20% for women. The fraction of female co-workers also has a strong negative impact on
individual wages.
21   According to the results from specification [3] in Table 3, a switch from
having all-male co-workers to all-female co-workers is associated with a 5% reduction in wages
for men and 16% reduction for women.
Adding Controls for the Probability of a Firm-Specific Contract
A second source of potential bias in the estimated wage premium for working under a
firm-specific contract is the presence of workplace-specific factors that are correlated with the
presence of a firm-specific contract.  As discussed earlier, our approach to this problem is to
augment the wage models for men and women with a low order polynomial function of the
estimated probability of having a firm-level contract at the individual’s workplace.16
We began by fitting a flexible probit model (at the workplace level) for the incidence of a
firm-specific contract, using as covariates the mean age and education of the workforce, the
fractions of workers in different occupation groups, the fraction of female workers and workers
with a temporary contract, dummies for the market orientation of the firm and the size of the
establishment, and controls for industry and region.  We then formed the predicted probability
(or propensity score) for each workplace, and assigned this to the corresponding group of
workers.  Finally, we estimated a variant of the specification [3] from Table 3 that includes a
third-order polynomial in the estimated propensity score.  
The results are summarized in Table 4.  For convenience, we show only the estimated
firm-specific contracting effects, and the coefficients of the propensity score terms.  (The other
coefficients are quite similar to the coefficients from the corresponding models in Table 3).  The
estimates suggest that it is important to control flexibly for the different characteristics of
employers that do and do not offer firm-specific contracts, particularly for men.  Relative to the
models that exclude the propensity score terms, the estimated premiums in Table 4 are are about
30% smaller.   The implied values of the propensity score terms are also interesting, since these
indicate the wage differences associated with different propensities, irrespective of the actual
contract status.  For men, the polynomial is concave, rising from 0 at p=0 to 0.12 at p=0.4, and
0.16 at p=0.8.  For women, the polynomial is nearly linear, reaching 0.09 at p=0.4 and 0.23 at
p=0.8.   Since firms that actually offer firm-level contracts tend to have higher propensities,
adding the polynomial in the propensity score lowers the estimated wage premium for firm-level
contracting.  We suspect that the propensity score terms control for some important interactions
between industry, firm size, and worker characteristics that are missing from the more
conventional specifications in Table 3.17
Analysis by Skill Group
Although the models in Tables 3 and 4 show the effect of firm-level contracting on mean 
wages, they do not address the question of whether the effect is different for different skill
groups. To answer this question, we fit a series of separate models for workers in different wage
quintiles.  We began by calculating the 20th, 40th, 60th and 80th percentiles of the wage
distributions of men and women.  We then estimated ordered probit models, separately by
gender, to predict the probability that a given person would earn a wage in one of the five
quintile ranges.   The prediction models include age and education, temporary contract status,
and occupation dummies (see Appendix A2).   We then used the predicted probabilities as
weights and estimated 5 separate models for each gender, in each case weighting an individual
observation by his or her predicted probability of earning a wage in the given quintile.  The
advantage of this method, over alternative deterministic classification methods, is that it takes
account of the uncertainty in predicting wage outcomes. 
Table 5 summarizes the estimated firm-level contract effects from four different versions
of these quintile-specific wage models.  The different models correspond to the specifications in
Tables 3 and 4: model [1] includes only a firm-contract dummy; model [2] adds individual and 
firm characteristics; model [3] adds co-worker characteristics;  and finally model [4] adds a
cubic in the predicted probability of a firm level contract at the individual’s workplace.  For
reference, we also show the fraction of workers with firm-specific contracts in each wage group. 
For men, the estimated effects of working under a firm level contract are roughly
constant across wage groups when we exclude any other controls, but in models [2]-[4] there is a
tendency for a higher premium among higher-wage groups.  Our most general specification18
suggests that the premium rises from 5% to nearly 9% between the lowest and highest wage
groups.  Thus, it appears that firm-specific contracting raises the magnitude of skill differentials
relative to sectoral contracting.  Nevertheless, the effect is relatively modest: the mean wage gap
between quintiles 1 and 5 is predicted to be about 4 percentage points wider for workers paid
under firm-specific contracts.   An interesting feature of the quintile specific wage effects in
Table 5 is that the average of the estimated effects across the five quintiles tends to be bigger
than the estimated effect from corresponding model fit to the pooled sample of men in Table 3 or
4.   We suspect the discrepancy arises from the fact that the overall model restricts the effects of
the covariates to be the same at different points in the wage distribution, whereas the quintile-
specific models relax this restriction.   
The results for women are similar to the results for men, although among women there is
an even stronger tendency for the contracting premium to rise across the wage quintiles.  In our
most general specification (model [4]), the premium for the lowest-wage women is nearly zero,
while the premium for women in the top quintile is 10.1%.  Thus, the wage gap between
quintiles 1 and 5 is predicted to be about 9 percentage points wider for women paid under firm-
specific contracts than under sectoral contracts.
Taken as a whole, the results in Tables 3-5 point to three main conclusions.  First, there is
a positive wage premium associated with firm-level contracting in Spain.  Given the institutional
setting, we believe this makes sense.  Worker representatives only have an incentive to establish
a firm-specific contract if they think that such an agreement will yield more favorable terms that
the default sectoral contract.  Moreover, although in our sample period firm-specific contracts
could technically offer wages below the prevailing sectoral contract, until just a year before the
ESS95 survey this was not allowed.  A second conclusion is that the average wage premium is19
relatively modest: almost surely under 10 percent, and perhaps as low as 5 percent.  In wage
models with controls for worker, firm, and co-worker characteristics the premium is on the order
of 7-11 percent.  Adding additional controls for the probability of a firm-level contract at the
individual’s workplace lowers the estimated premium to a range of 5-8 percent.  A third
conclusion is that the premium for firm-specific contracting is higher for more highly-paid
workers.  This result contrasts with the unionized wage premium in the U.S. and U.K., which is
generally found to be lower for more highly-paid workers, at least among men.  
VI.  Analysis of Job Tenure
The evidence we have assembled so far suggests there is a positive wage premium
associated with firm-level contracting that tends to rise with skill level.  The simplest
interpretation is that the premium represents a rent, captured by works councils with enough
bargaining power to negotiate a contract offering wages above the prevailing sectoral agreement. 
The fact that firms voluntarily sign such contracts, however, raises the possibility of alternative
interpretations, such as an efficiency wage premium.  Even if the wage gains associated with a
newly negotiated firm-level contract are initially pure rents, over time employers have strong
incentives to “recapture” the rents by boosting effort levels or raising recruiting standards,
converting the rent premiums into compensating wage differentials or unmeasured ability
effects.  
One way to evaluate the alternative interpretations is to examine differences in job tenure
by contracting status.  If the wage premium is a compensating wage differential, or a return to
unmeasured ability, it should not necessarily affect job tenures.  If the premium includes a rent
component, however, then it should reduce voluntary turnover, leading to longer job durations at20
22The models used to predict the wage include the same variables used in the tenure model,
so the “main effect” of the predicted wage is not identified.  
establishments with firm-specific contracts.  Of course differences in observed tenure reflect
many other factors, including differences in firm growth rates and retirement patterns, so the
power of the evidence is limited.
Table 6 presents a series of regression models for observed job tenure, fit to the
subsample of workers in the ESS95 between the ages of  24 and 65.  In an attempt to control as
flexibly as possible for differences in the relative numbers of young and old workers in the
different contract sectors, all the models include a full set of age dummies.  Specifications [2]
and [3] also include controls for education, region, occupation, industry, firm market orientation,
and firm size.  In addition, the third specification includes an interaction between the firm-
specific contract dummy and the predicted log wage for each worker (estimated using data for
workers with sectoral contracts only).  The interaction term provides a simple way to measure
how the gap in job tenure at workplaces with firm-specific contracts varies across the skill
distribution.
22
The results from specification [1] imply that workers covered by firm-level contracts
have 4-5 years of additional job tenure, relative to those of the same age in the other sector. 
Some of this is clearly attributable to firm size and the other control variables: the gaps drop to
just over 2 years in specification [2].   This gap is a little smaller in magnitude than the 3.2 year
difference in tenure for unionized U.S. workers measured by Krueger and Summers (1988, Table
IX).  
The results of the interacted specifications suggest that the impact of a firm-specific
contract on job tenure is significant bigger for more highly skilled men.  The point estimate21
suggests that the sectoral difference in mean tenure rises by 1 year for each 40 percent increase
in expected wages.  Since our estimates of the firm-specific contracting effect on wages show a
larger effect for higher-wage men, the positive interaction effect is consistent with a very simple
rent explanation.  For women, however, the interaction effect is only about one-sixth as big, and
is not statistically significant.  Since we also find a larger wage premium for higher-wage
women, the lack of a large or significant interaction effect in the tenure model is less supportive
of the rent hypothesis.  Overall, there is clear evidence that workers stay longer at jobs covered
by firm-specific contracts, but the variation in this effect across skill groups is only partially
explained by the pattern of contracting effects on wages of different skill groups. 
VI.  Interpretation and Conclusions
In this paper we use a matched worker-firm data set to examine the impact of firm-level
contracting on the level and structure of wages in Spain.  We find that wages set by firm-level
contracting are higher than wages governed by industry-wide or national contracts.  We also find
that firm-level contracts tend to raise wages more for more highly-paid workers.  The wage
premium for firm-level bargaining is associated with longer job tenures, suggesting that at least
some of the premium is a non-competitive rent, although the absence of a bigger tenure effect for
more highly skilled women means that structure of the premium cannot be fully explained by
relative rents.
Our findings contrast with the results of Hartog, Leuven, and Teulings (2002) who report
that mean wages under firm-specific and industry-level contracting are very similar in the
Netherlands.  They explain the absence of a premium for firm-level contracting as a consequence
of the corporatist Dutch system, in which unions do not operate as aggressive local rent seekers. 22
Our findings are more consistent with the results of Dell’Aringa and Lucifora (1994), who find a
statistically significant pay advantage (on the order of 5%) for manufacturing workers in Italy
whose wages are set by a firm-level contract.  Interestingly, Dell’Aringa and Lucifora conclude
that firm-level bargaining raises wages more for white collar workers than blue collar workers,
paralleling our findings across wage quintiles in Spain.
The tendency for firm-level contracting to raise the relative wages of more highly-paid
workers is the opposite of the decentralized bargaining effect in the U.S. or the U.K., where
union contracts tend to “flatten” wages across skill groups relative to the non-union sector.  In
the Spanish system of extended sectoral contracts, however, the alternative to an establishment-
level agreement is a regional or national agreement, which may itself impose a relatively flat
wage structure.  Thus, there is some indication that firm-level bargaining leads to a more
“flexible” wage structure.   The pattern of wage premiums for firm-level contracting also
suggests that collective bargaining matters for all skill groups, not just lower-skilled workers, as
has been hypothesized by Bover, Bentolila and Arellano (2002).
An caveat to these conclusions is that there may be unobserved skill differences between
workers covered by firm-level and sectoral contracts.  Our data set includes a relatively rich set
of employer and employee characteristics, including the mean characteristics of co-workers
which provide a useful proxy for unobserved ability components.  We have also tried to control
as flexibly as possible for observed differences in the characteristics of workplaces that have
sectoral versus firm-specific contracts.  Nevertheless, employers forced to pay a wage premium
under a firm-specific contract have incentives to seek out the most qualified workers, and this
mechanism may lead to systematic differences in unobserved characteristics that cannot be fully
eliminated in an observational study.23
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      All
    Firm-
  Specific
  Industry-
  Regional 
     Industry-
     National
Age Distribution:
Under  30  0.25 0.15 0.28 0.27
30-44 0.44 0.43 0.44 0.46
45-55 0.23 0.33 0.21 0.20
Over 55 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.06
Education Distribution:
Primary 0.34 0.35 0.38 0.29
Secondary 0.55 0.51 0.55 0.59
University 0.10 0.14 0.07 0.12
Fraction Male 0.77 0.83 0.78 0.72
Fraction Fixed-Term Contracts 0.27 0.10 0.26
Mean Tenure (years) 10.67 15.36 8.73 9.98
Establishment Size Distribution:
11-20 0.20 0.05 0.27 0.22
21-50 0.26 0.12 0.32 0.27
51-100 0.17 0.15 0.18 0.16
101-200 0.15 0.21 0.13 0.13
Over  200 0.22 0.46 0.10 0.22
Industry Distribution:
Manufacturing 0.65 0.84 0.56 0.63
Construction 0.07 0.01 0.12 0.04
Trade 0.09 0.04 0.13 0.08
Hotels 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.01
Transportation 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.01
Financial Services 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.16
Other Services 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.06
Product Market Orientation:
Local 0.32 0.18 0.43 0.28
Regional 0.54 0.60 0.44 0.62
International 0.14 0.23 0.13 0.10
Occupation Distribution:
Managers and Technicians 0.15 0.21 0.10 0.17
Clerical Workers 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.18
Service Workers 0.07 0.02 0.10 0.06
Qualified Manual Workers 0.48 0.53 0.50 0.43
Number of Observations 130,170 29,599 55,115 45,456
    
     Note: Samples include all full time workers with valid information on key variables in ESS-95. Table 2: Mean Log Wages by Type of Contract
Mean Log
Wage
Standard
Deviation
Standardized
Mean Log
Wage
Standardized 
Standard
Deviation 
All Workers
Overall 6.79 0.51
Firm Contract 7.06 0.47 6.89 0.51
Regional Contract 6.67 0.46 6.78 0.46
National Contract 6.78 0.53 6.76 0.49
Males
Overall 6.85 0.51
Firm  Contract 7.10 0.46 6.95 0.50
Regional Contract 6.73 0.45 6.82 0.48
National Contract 6.86 0.54 6.82 0.49
Females
Overall 6.59 0.45
Firm Contract 6.88 0.49 6.69 0.49
Regional Contract 6.48 0.39 6.59 0.41
National Contract 6.58 0.45 6.56 0.43
Note: Standardized mean and standard deviation are obtained from weighted sample, using 
DiNardo, Fortín, Lemieux (1996) procedure.   Samples are 130,170  for all workers,
100,533 for males and 29,637  for females.Table 3: Log Wage Regressions
Men Women
[1] [2] [3] [1] [2] [3] 
Firm Contract 0.317
(0.013)
0.082
(0.012)
0.074
(0.009)
0.343
(0.024)
0.126
(0.015)
0.108
(0.012)
Worker’s Skills
Education 0.026
(0.0009)
0.024
(0.001)
0.021
(0.001)
0.017
(0.001)
Age 0.011
(0.0002)
0.010
(0.0002)
0.010
(0.0004)
0.008
(0.0004)
Fixed-Term contract -0.198
(0.006)
-0.183
(0.005)
-0.170
(0.011)
-0.155
(0.012)
Firm’s Characteristics (ref: Local product market, privately owned,10-20 workers)
National Market  0.050
(0.009)
0.048
(0.007)
0.055
(0.010)
0.048
(0.009)
International Market  0.064
(0.015)
0.060
(0.011)
0.075
(0.018)
0.062
(0.017)
Publicly Owned 0.061
(0.042)
0.060
(0.033)
0.129
(0.040)
0.142
(0.033)
20-50 Workers 0.062
(0.009)
0.062
(0.007)
0.020
(0.011)
0.017
(0.011)
51-100 Workers 0.120
(0.012)
0.121
(0.010)
0.066
(0.014)
0.053
(0.013)
101-200 Workers 0.132
(0.012)
0.135
(0.010)
0.105
(0.016)
0.083
(0.015)
Over 200 Workers 0.202
(0.013)
0.204
(0.011)
0.158
(0.014)
0.132
(0.013)
Average Characteristics of Co-workers in Same Firm and Occupation Group
Education 0.004
(0.002)
0.007
(0.002)
Age 0.003
(0.0009)
0.005
(0.001)
Proportion Under 30  -0.085
(0.016)
-0.034
(0.021)
Proportion Over 50 -0.109
(0.020)
-0.147
(0.030)
Proportion Female -0.052
(0.016)
-0.155
(0.014)
Intercept 6.789
(0.003)
5.88
(0.020)
5.84
(0.039)
6.53
(0.003)
5.75
(0.029)
5.78
(0.06)
R-squared 0.068 0.507 0.511 0.07 0.496 0.508
Notes. All models except  [1]  also include 16 indicators for region, 4 indicators for occupation and 6 indicators for
industry.  Sample size for all models is 100,533 for men and 29,637 for women.  Standard errors are calculated with
clustering by firms. Table 4: Log Wage Regressions – p-score value added as a regressor
MEN WOMEN
Firm Contract 0.053
(0.010)
0.069
(0.012)
 Propensity score  0.609
(0.113)
0.024
(0.167)
 Squared propensity score   -1.08
(0.312)
0.635
(0.468)
 Cubed propensity Score 0.703
(0.237)
-0.383
(0.364)
R-squared 0.513 0.514
Note: Although not reported, estimations also include all covariates included in model  [3]  of Table 3, i.e, individual
observable skills, job characteristics, average skills of the co-workers, plus  16 indicators for region, 4 indicators for
occupation and 6 indicators for industry .  Sample size is 100,533 for men and 29,637 for women.   Standard errors
are calculated with clustering by firms. Table 5: Estimation of Firm-Contract Effect by Wage Quintile
Men Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5
Fraction with
firm contracts 0.098 0.109 0.242 0.389 0.411
Model [1] 0.253
(0.010)
0.267
(0.008)
0.257
(0.008)
0.241
(0.009)
0.222
(0.011)
Model [2] 0.075
(0.009)
0.095
(0.008)
0.103
(0.008)
0.104
(0.008)
0.101
(0.010)
Model [3] 0.064
(0.008)
0.085
(0.007)
0.093
(0.007)
0.098
(0.007)
0.098
(0.009)
Model [4] 0.050
(0.008)
0.072
(0.007)
0.082
(0.007)
0.088
(0.007)
0.088
(0.010)
Women
Fraction with
firm contracts 0.098 0.067 0.101 0.220 0.380
Model [1] 0.167
 (0.018)
0.242
(0.015)
0.277
(0.013)
0.294
(0.012)
0.288
(0.014)
Model [2] 0.056
(0.014)
0.101
(0.012)
0.123
(0.011)
0.134
(0.010)
0.131
(0.012)
Model [3] 0.037
(0.013)
0.077
(0.011)
0.098
(0.010)
0.111
 (0.010)
0.114
(0.013)
Model  [4] 0.008
(0.013)
0.050
(0.011)
0.074
(0.011)
0.092
(0.011)
0.101
(0.014)
Notes: Models [1] to [3] correspond to specifications in Table 3.  Model [4] correspond to specifications in Table 4. 
Samples include 100,533 men and 29,637 women.   Standard errors are calculated with clustering by firms.Table 6: Models for Worker Tenure
Men Women
[1] [2] [3] [1] [2] [3]
Firm Contract 4.90
(0.22)
2.21
(0.19)
-14.63
(3.05)
4.04
(0.30)
2.05
(0.18)
-0.73
(6.05)
Firm Contract*
Predicted Wage
2.42
(0.44)
0.41
(0.90)
Education -0.13
(0.01)
-0.15
(0.01)
-0.17
(0.02)
-0.17
(0.03)
Market Orientation (ref: Local Market)
National Market 0.70
(0.16)
0.71
(0.16)
1.01
(0.17)
1.01
(0.22)
International Market 0.73
(0.25)
0.68
(0.25)
0.74
(0.22)
0.74
(0.33)
Firm’s Size (ref: 10-20 Workers)
21-50 Workers 0.45
(0.17)
0.47
(0.17)
0.64
(0.20)
0.64
(0.25)
51-100 Workers 1.67
(0.20)
1.69
(0.20)
1.48
(0.21)
1.48
(0.29)
101-200 Workers 2.28
(0.23)
2.31
(0.23)
2.14
(0.21)
2.14
(0.31)
Over 200 workers 3.78
(0.22)
3.73
(0.22)
3.22
(0.22)
3.21
(0.32)
Public firm 1.17
(0.67)
0.48
(0.66)
1.34
(0.57)
1.18
(0.63)
R-squared 0.39 0.47 0.47 0.34 0.42 0.42
Notes:  Dependent variable is years of employment at current firm.  Samples include only workers age 25-65.  All
models include full set of dummies for each single year of age.  Specifications [2] and [3] also include 16 indicators
for region, 4 indicators for occupation and 6 indicators for industry.   Predicted wage included as interaction with
firm contract indicator in specification [3] is based on regression model fit on subsample of workers with sectoral
contract, using same covariates included as main effects in specifications [2] and [3]. Standard errors are calculated
with clustering by firms.Table A1: Log Wage Regressions with Alternative Co-workers’ Groupings
Men Women
[1] [2] [1] [2]
Firm Contract 0.063
(0.011)
0.072
(0.008)
0.096
(0.014)
0.112
(0.011)
Worker’s skills
Education 0.022
(0.0008)
0.011
(0.001)
0.014
(0.001)
0.009
(0.002)
Age 0.010
(0.0002)
0.007
(0.0002)
0.009
(0.0004)
0.006
(0.0005)
Fixed-Term Contract -0.179
(0.006)
-0.174
(0.005)
-0.150
(0.011)
-0.150
(0.012)
Firm’s Characteristics (ref: Local product market, privately owned,10-20 workers)
National Market  0.042
(0.009)
0.046
(0.007)
0.042
(0.010)
0.049
(0.009)
International Market 0.053
(0.014)
0.059
(0.009)
0.060
(0.017)
0.065
(0.016)
Publicly Owned 0.059
(0.041)
0.060
(0.024)
0.139
(0.039)
0.138
(0.031)
21-50 Workers 0.063
(0.008)
0.062
(0.007)
0.022
(0.011)
0.016
(0.010)
51-100 Workers 0.121
(0.011)
0.120
(0.008)
0.063
(0.013)
0.058
(0.012)
101-200 Workers 0.124
(0.012)
0.136
(0.009)
0.096
(0.017)
0.085
(0.014)
Over 200 Workers 0.202
(0.012)
0.204
(0.009)
0.145
(0.014)
0.133
(0.012)
Average Characteristics of Co-workers in Same Firm and Occupation Group
Education 0.011
(0.002)
0.021
(0.004)
0.017
(0.002)
0.017
(0.002)
Age 0.004
(0.002)
0.007
(0.0007)
0.005
(0.002)
0.007
(0.001)
Proportion Under 30 -0.124
(0.032)
-0.091
(0.012)
-0.048
(0.036)
-0.056
(0.017)
Proportion Over 50 -0.172
(0.040)
-0.093
(0.014)
-0.112
(0.052)
-0.129
(0.024)
Proportion Female -0.074
(0.020)
-0.097
(0.016)
-0.174
(0.019)
-0.150
(0.014)
 R-squared 0.513 0.517 0.512 0.512
Note: See notes to Table 3.  In specification [1], co-workers consist of all employees at the same workplace.   In
specification [2], co-workers consist of all employees at the same workplace in the same 2-digit occupation group
(53 groups).    All models include 16 indicators for region, 4 indicators for occupation, and 6 indicators for industry.  
Standard errors are calculated with clustering by firms.  
 
 
 
Table A2: Ordered Probit model for the Probability of 
Being in Different Wage Quintiles 
  
Men 
 
Women 
Age 
 
0.038 
(0.0006) 
0.041 
(0.001) 
Education 
 
0.101 
(0.002) 
0.091 
(0.003) 
Fixed-term contract 
 
-0.839 
(0.014) 
-0.720 
(0.022) 
 
Occupations (reference: Non-Qualified Manual) 
Managers and 
Technicians  
0.601 
(0.023) 
1.076 
(0.043) 
Clerical   0.061 
(0.023) 
0.368 
(0.032) 
Service   -0.408 
(0.028) 
-0.015 
(0.032) 
Qualified Manual  -0.004 
(0.016) 
0.090 
(0.028) 
 
Pseudo-R
2 0.151  0.148 
 
Number of Observations  100,533  29,637 
  Note: See text. Models are ordered probit models with 5 ranges 
  based on unconditional quintiles of gender-specific wage distribution. 
  Robust standard errors in parentheses.   
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Mean Wages Firm vs other contracts - Males
6.5
6.7
6.9
7.1
7.3
7.5
7.7
7.9
6.5 6.7 6.9 7.1 7.3 7.5 7.7 7.9
  Other than Firm Contracts
F
i
r
m
 
C
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
s
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Mean Log Wages - Firm vs Other than Firm Contracts - 
Females
6.2
6.4
6.6
6.8
7
7.2
7.4
6.2 6.4 6.6 6.8 7 7.2 7.4
Other than Firm Contracts
F
i
r
m
 
C
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
s
 
 
 
 
 
 
 